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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THEODORE SAMUEL 
PACHECO, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL 
STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
17342 
This is an appeal brought by the Appellant from 
a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury on the counts of 
2nd Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny. 
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The facts offer1ed at trial were that Defendant to-
gether with two co-defendants were apprehended in the 
Payless Builders Supply approximately 1 :30 a.m. on the 
12th day of Dec:ember, 1960. Further, that there was 
1nissing out of the cash box the sum of $124.67; none 
of which was found in the possession of the Defendant 
at the time he was apprehended. 
Approximately three hours before the apprehension, 
one Gerald D. Shelton, co-defendant, notified a member 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, namely, Gary 
Parks, that a burglary was to be committed at the Ream's 
Bargain Basement located at 2700 South State Street, 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah. After notifying Gary Parks, Ger-
ald D. Shelton went looking for the Defendant-Appellant 
and located him at a house belonging to the Defendant's 
fiance. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant, Gerald D. 
Shelton and Johnny J\furkhan1 went do:wn to Ream's 
Bargain Basement, but no crime offense was conlmitted. 
Having decided not to com1nit the crime, the three went 
to the Payless Builders Supply. Enroute, they stopped 
at a gas station at the request of Gerald D. Shelton. 
At that point, Shelton gave the attendant a slip of paper 
hearing Gary Park's home phone number and informed 
the attendant that he was an undercover agent for the 
Salt Lake Police Deparhnent and to call the nu1nber on 
the slip of paper and to say "the Payless Lmnber the 
ti1ne has been changed." After the Defendant left, the 
attendant ca11ed the number and a wmnan answered. 
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The woman indicated that she knew nothing of the situa-
tion. \VhPreupon, the attendant called the Salt Lake 
Police Departinent and released the information. Short-
ly thereafter, Gary Parks, in the company of Sheriff Pete 
Haywood, Salt Lake City Sheriff Department, arrived 
and took possession of the piece of paper. From the gas 
station the~, proceeded up to Payless Builders Supply 
and apprehended the Defendant-Appellant and co-defen-
dants. 
This appeal raises for review by this court, three 
questions of law: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
TO DISMISS THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INFORMA-
TION, TO WIT: GRAND LARCENCY, ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THAT 
CHARGE. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ALLOWING THE JURY TO SEPARATE AFTER THE CASE 
WAS SUBMITTED 'TO THEM FOR THEIR DELIBERATION. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE JURY IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF 
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY AND GRAND LARCENY 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPED INTO THE COM-
:\IISSION OF THE CRIME. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
TO DISMISS THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INFORMA-
·TION, TO WIT: GRAND LARCENCY, ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THAT 
CHARGE. 
Grand Larceny is defined in Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) 76-38-1 and 4 as "The felonious stealing, taking, 
carrying, leading or drawing away of personal property 
of another." Said property taken is of the value exceed-
ing $50.00. 
The testimony produced at trial indicated that the 
cash box contained $124.67 (R. 37). Also, the evidenc.e 
adduced by the State indicated that the sum of $80.00 
was taken from Johnny Markham (R. 66), and that the 
sum of $50.00 was found to he in the possession of Gerald 
D. Shelton (R. 135). No n1oney was found on the 
Defendant's person (R. 54, R. 78, R. 108). It was further 
borne out at trial that the n1oney was never taken from 
the premises of the Payless Builders Supply. 
Possession under the above quoted section has been 
construed as meaning personal, conscious, and exclusive 
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possession. State vs. Dyitt, 114 Utah 379, 199 P. 2d 155 
(l~H~); State vs. Brooks (1942), 101 Utah 584, 126 P. 2d 
l 0-l--t-. There was no evidence elicited to the effect that 
the Defendant had possession of any of the monies taken 
fron1 the cash box. Further, the fact that the participants 
of the criine were apprehended in the very room where 
the money was kept, the money had not yet been reduced 
to the exclusive possession of any of the participants. 
It is respe·c.tfully submitted that possession must be 
of the type inconsistent with the possession of the true 
O\vner and until said property is taken from the premises 
or room, the possession of the participants is. not suffi-
cient. to warrant exclusive don1ination of the property. 
Not having found proof proving exclusive posses-
sion on the part of the Defendant, the trial court relied 
npon the theory of principals (R. 80), i.e., possession of 
those who· are found to have aided and abetted is suffi-
cient possession. Tlris application of the theory is an 
erroneous application of the law. As the record abun-
dantly illustrates, Gerald D. Shelton cannot be said to 
have asstuned the role of an acemnplice. In the case of 
TVil.'wn vs. People (1939), 103 Colo. 441, 87 P. 2d 5, 120 
A.L.R. 1501, the court cites Price vs. People, 109 Ill. 109, 
P. 115, llG, wherein Defendant contacted the constable, 
giving true nanws and place, time, and nrune of intended 
Yietinl. After the erilne, he went and furnished the par-
ticulars of the eri1ne. The court held: 
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"That a sane person really guilty of com-
mitting a grave crime would thus act is so incon-
sistent with all human experience as not to war-
rant the conviction of anyone under the circum-
stances shown." 
The record clearly shows that he executed every 
effort to contact the police of the change in plans and 
also was instructed by Gary Parks, Salt Lake Police 
Department, to go along with planned burglary. The 
record is void of any intent on the part of Gerald D. 
Shelton to commit the crime of burglary and grand lar-
ceny. Query: Can the Defendant be charged with the 
aiding and abetting of another participant ·when the 
latter cannot be found to possess the requisite intent 
or possession necessary for the commission of the crime. 
It is submitted that the only answer is no. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT COMMI'TTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ALLOWING THE JURY TO SEPARATE AFTER THE CASE 
WAS SUBMITTED ·TO THEM FOR THEIR DELIBERATION. 
The trial court permitted the jury to separate for 
the noon hour frmn 12 :00 p.m. to 1 :30 p.m. (R. 161). 
The separation occurred without the consent of the 
Defendant and after the closing arguments of the State 
and the Defense (R. 161). The instructions to the jury 
preceded the closing arglunents (R. 152, 161). 
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Utah law in this area is largely derived from statutes 
wher<>in the Trial Court is instructed as to the proper 
:;;upervision over the jury. 
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-27 (1953 as amended) 
states: •' The jurors sworn to try a criminal action may, 
at any time before submission of the case to the jury, 
in the discretion of the Court, be permitted to separate 
or be kept in charge of a proper officer" ... The statutes 
are silent as to separation of the jury after submission. 
Directing our attention to what constitut!es "sub-
Inission", we find that the general rule is that where 
eharges precede the arguments, submission occurs at the 
(•lose of the argument. 34 A.L.R. 1212. People vs. Von 
Jfaltic (1931), 119 CaL App. 568, 5 P. 2d 917; Evans vs. 
State (192-1), ______ Okla. Cr. Rep., ______ 221 P. 794. This 
would be applicable in the instant case. 
Generally, in felony criminal cases, prejudice is 
i>resunied from the fact if an unauthorized separation 
after submission, at least where the circumstances are 
~ueh as. to 1nake it reasonably appear that the jury 
might have been tampered with. 53 Am. Jur. Sec. 879. 
It should be noted that although there does exist 
a statute allowing the Trial Court, in its discretion, to 
pennit the jury to separate before submission, there is 
no statute ·which allows this discretion after the. case 
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has been finally submitted to the jury. Can it he suc-
cessfully advaneed that the Trial Court has the implied 
authority to that concerning which the law is silent~ This 
precise question confronted North Dakota courts in 1932 
and the court clearly indicated that a statute similar 
to that found in Utah is the only statute which gives the 
court the authority to separate jurors and that the trial 
court does not obtain the implied authority to separate 
the jury. State vs. Tamoreaux (1932, 241 N.D. 595). 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), 77-31-32, states: 
"After hearing the charge, the jury may 
~either decide in court or may retire for delibera-
tion. If they do not agree without retiring, an 
officer must be sworn to keep them together in 
some private and convenient place, and not to 
permit any person to speak to or communicate 
with them, nor to do so himself, unless by order 
of the court, or to ask them whether they have 
agreed upon a verdict, and to return them into 
court when they have so agreed, or when ordered 
by the court." 
This statute has been wisely interpreted to safe-
guard in every possible way the purity of the stream of 
justice; and to pr,event it from in any manner being 
polluted by influences other than those which are pro-
duced by the legal evidence and the law governing the 
case. Bilton vs. Territory (1909), 1 Old. Cr. 566, 99 P. 
163. 
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Again, in Armstrong vs. State (1909), 2 Okla. Cr. 
5G7, 103 Par. 658, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 776, the court stated 
that this section imperatively required that the jury 
cannot be separated after submission and, if such separ-
ation is permitted, the verdict is vitiated notwithstanding 
no affirmative proof of prejudice is offered. The court 
further stated: 
"vVhen this provision of law if violated, the 
legal presumption is that it has actually preju-
diced the Defendant, or tended to his prejudice, 
in respect to a substantial right." 
Thus, it would appear that the Defendant's sub-
stantial rights had been violated by the trial court's per-
mitting the separation of the jury after the cause had 
been finally submitted. 
The precise question here on appeal is a novel one. 
In State vs. Thorne (1911), 39 U. 208, 117 P. 58, the 
question presented dealt with the misconduct of a juror 
who n1ade unauthorized telephone conversation to some-
one without the court's permission. The court proper 
said: 
"After a final submission to the jury and 
before reaching a decision as to their verdict, to 
permit a juror without court's permission to leave 
his fellow jurors and to go to another portion of 
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the building and there engage in a private con-
versation over the telephone is a practice not to 
be tolerated." 
Again, in State vs. Jarrett (1947), 112 Utah 335, 187 
P. 2d 547, this court held that it was not reversible 
error to deny the motion for new trial on the grounds 
that some~ of the jurors separated without leave of the 
court. The s~eparation was based upon necessity and 
under the surveillance of the Baliff. The court further 
states that it is conversation ·with third parties that are 
condemned and that the Defendant has a right to have a 
jury secluded from outside influences while deliberating 
and that this right should be jealously guarded. 
It cannot· be said ·that trial court, in permitting the 
jury to separate after all of the evidence had been sub-
n1itted, after the instructions ""\Vere delivered and after 
arguments of counsel, jealously guarded the Defendant'~ 
right to have the jury secluded frmn outside influences. 
Concededly, absolute isolation is not reasonably possible. 
State vs. Jarrett, supra. Yet, it is unreasonable to 
allow separation foi~ lunch after subn1ission without 
supervision of the Baliff in view of the 1Jtah statute 
pennitting the jurors to be provided with food. See 
1JCA 77-32-1. It cannot he successfully 1naintained that 
during the hour and a half hmch period tl1at none of 
the jurors had any conversations with third persons. 
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
THE JURY IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF 
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY AND GRAND LARCENY 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPED INTO THE COM-
MISSION OF THE CRIME. 
Although the doctrine of entrapment is found to 
exist in all the jurisdictions in the country, t'here does 
exist a divergence of views as the basis upon which 
ths doctrine lies. Serrells vs. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 
53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. 2d 413, wherein the purported basis 
was fotmded upon statutory constriction. Later in Sher-
man vs. U.S. (1958), 356 U.S. 332, 78 S. Ct. 819, 2 L. Ed. 
:2 -!-!~, the language of the n1ajority indicates that the 
majorit~~ is thinking in terms of Supreme Court's super-
visory function over the administration of criminal jus-
tee in the Federal Court or in terms of a violation of the 
constitution protected right. See 49 Jo1tn. Grim. Law 449 
(1959). 
This court as early as 1912 established the policy 
that this court would, and properly so, carefully scrutin-
ize the evidence the offense was induced by, so-called 
private detectives and informers. Chief Justice Frick 
in City vs. Robinson (1912), 40 Utah 448, 125 Pac. 667, 
661 stated: 
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"When it is n1ade to appear that an offense 
charged was induced by a detective or other or 
that such detective or person was paid for obtain-
ing the evidence necessary to convict, or that he 
is to receive additional compensation in case of 
conviction, both the prosecuting officers and the 
trial courts should carefully scrutinize the evi-
dence and should permit no conviction to be had, 
or if had, to stand in case the offense was induced 
as aforesaid, and in case of paid evidence none 
should be perrnitted to stand if there is any doubt 
of the guilt of the accused." 
Nine years later, this court endorsed the principles 
set forth by Chief Justice Frick in a unanimous opinion 
in State vs. McCamish (1921), 59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637, 
rehe,aring denied 1921, wherein the court added: 
"Policemen are conservators of the peace. 
It is their duty to prevent crime, not to instigate 
or encourage its cOinmission. Nothing is more 
reprehensible than to induce the commission of 
crime for the purpose of apprehending and con-
victing the perpetrator~" 
In denying the petition for rehearing, the court 
reiterated its position by stating: 
"'r:l'he rule that officers of the law are not per-
Initted to induce aets eonstituting erin1es which 
would not have been cmn1nitted but for such 
inducement and that convictions based upon such 
induce1nent will not be pennitted to stand, is both 
wholesmne and saluting onee should be enforced.'' 
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Thus, it would appear that this court bases the doc-
trine of 0ntrapment on the same grounds as is found 
in the Sherma ll case, supra, and properly so, inasmuch 
aH the same policy bases for reversal of a judgment as is 
found in judicial supervision of contempts, or to exclude 
illegally seized evidence or coerced confessions, to wit: 
"Judicial supervision of administration of 
criminal justice in Federal courts implies the duty 
of establishing and maintaining civilized stand-
ards of procedure." Jl!l eN abb vs. U.S., 318 U.S. 
332 (1943). Also, see Jones vs. State (1960), 101 
Ga. 851, 101 Ga. 851, 115 S.E. 2d 576, wherein 
the court stated : 
''Prosecutor's conduct falls short of the high 
standards that must be set by law enforcement 
officers in administration of justice in the sov-
ereign state of Georgia and we cannot approve 
of it.'' 
This attitude is abundantly exhibited in one of our 
~ister states, narnely, California, where the court stated 
in Peop1r vs. JJ![akovsky (1935), Cal. 2d 366, 44 P. 2d 536, 
People Y~. Calwn (1955 ), 44- Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905, 
50 A.L.R. 2d 513, and People vs. Bevford (1959), 53 Cal. 
:2d l, 34-5 P. 2d 928. An excellent discussion is found 
in the latter case where the court through Justice 
~ehauer stated that California has recognized the defense 
for reasons substantially sirnilar to those which cause 
the adoption of the rule that evidence obtained in vio-
lation of constitutional guarantees is not admissible, i.e. : 
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"Without regard for its own dignity, and 
in the exercise of its power and performance of 
its duty to formulate and apply proper standard 
for judicial enforcement of criminal law, the court 
refuses to enable officers of the law to consum-
mate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster 
ratherthan prevent and detect crime.'' P. 933. 
Thus, it would appear that this court has assumed 
the supervisory role over the administration of justice 
in our state and will not permit any conviction to he had 
where there exists any doubt of the guilt of the accused. 
City vs. Robinson, supra. .A.n analysis of the record 
below clearly indicates a substantial doubt as to 
the guilt of the defendant-appellant, and further that 
the evidence abundantly shows that defense of entrap-
ment 'vas clearly proven as a matter of law. Under such 
circumstances, this court n1ay so declare and reverse 
the judgment of the jury. Sherman vs. U.S., supra,. 
Accardi: vs. U.S. (1958), 257 F. 2d 168 (5 Cir.). \Vhere 
it ''ras held that the issue of entrapment is a question for 
the jury,- unless as a matter of law the accused has estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that he was entraped. 
This criteria places a great burden upon the Defendant 
than exists this jurisdiction. 
Gerald D. Shelton was ·working for the Salt Lake 
Police Department through Gary Parks (R. 123, R. 124); 
he was seeuring eompensation by means o.f reimbursed 
gas expenses (R. 124); he was permitted to operate his 
vehif'lP despite the fact that his license was revoked 
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( 1{. 1:2:1) ; he notified Gary Parks of the proposed bur-
glary at Ream's Bargain Basmnent and told that he 
would be protected (R. 122); he was on pre-arranged 
bond (R. 99·, R. 123). On the night in question, he went 
~PPkinp; the Defendant (R. 151, 152) and asked that the 
Defendant aecmnpany him (R. 104). The Defendant had 
no intention of committing any crime; he had made other 
arrangements (R. 150, 151). It was upon the insistence 
of Gerald D. Shelton that the Defendant accompanied 
him on the night in question. Further, it was at Gerald 
D. Shelton's insistence that the automobiles be switched 
(R. 105, 125). Arriving at Ream's Bargain Basement, 
the Defendant refused to follow Gerald Shelton's in-
structions (R. 106). vVhereupon, again at Gerald D. 
Shelton's request (R. 106), the Defendant drove to Pay-
less Builder's Supply where the crime was committed . 
• Just prior to this, Gerald D. Shelton had placed a note 
in the hands of a gas station attendant, said station 
being enroute, ·with instructions to call the police (R. 145, 
lOG: R. 1-t3, 146). 
Considering all of of the circumstances elicited on 
the lower court, it is clear that the commission of the 
erime ,,~ith which the Defendant was convicted was the 
··produet of the creative ability" of one Gerald D. Shelton 
who, by the evidence adduced, was working for the Police 
Department. Sherman vs. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct. 
~19, :2 L. Ed. 2d 4-t~ .. states: 
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"To determine whether entrapment has be:en 
established, a line must be drawn between the trap 
for the unwary innocent and a trap for the unwary 
criminal." 
There is no evidence that the Defendant was engaged 
in any unlawful business, or that the Defendant possessed 
a pre-existing criminal intent. People vs. Malotte (1956), 
46 Cal. 2d 59, 292, P. 2d 517; People vs. Terry (1955), 
44 Cal. 2d 371, 282 P. 2d 19. 
Nor is it clear that this court would permit such 
evidence to be allowed. Our sister state expressly dis-
tinguished the Federal Rule and California rule in this 
regard by stating: 
"In ·California, Evidence that Defendant had 
previously committed similar crimes or had repu-
tation of being engaged in the commission of such 
crimes or was suspected by police of criminal 
activities is not admissible on issue of entrap-
ment." People vs. Be1i,for.d, supra. 
To allow the conviction below to stand, would he to 
endorse the practices of the law enforcement officials 
to resort t:o the utilization of know'll felons and devious 
methods to apprehend unwary citizens. The initial con-
tac.t and negotiations for corruption come from the 
undercover agent, Gerald D. Shelton. The obstacles by 
use of agent's aut01nobile was re1noved by the agent. 
The polic.e were informed of the time and place of ulti-
Inate incident. a situation similar to that found in Jones 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
v~. State, supra. :Mere willingness to be corrupted can-
not be sufficient. The public policy against such conduct 
has been clearly established. Judicial integrity can only 
be protected by sustaining the appellant's claim for en-
trapment. 
CONCLUSION 
The record below clearly indicated that the court 
committed error in not sustaining the Defendant's motion 
to dismiss on the second count, to wit, Grand Larceny. 
Further, the court committed reversible error in 
permitting the jury to separate after the cause had been 
finally submitted to them for their deliberation. 
The evidence adduced at trial clearly establishes 
substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused and 
points out the reprehensible methods employed by the 
law enforcement officials in regards to apprehension 
and conviction of the Defendant. 
The Defendant-Appellant for reasons aforesaid re-
spectfully requests that the conviction of the Defendant 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1\IITSUNAGA & ROSS 
By JIMI 1\IITSUNAGA 
Attorneys for Appellant 
105 Empire Building 
231 E. Fourth South 
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